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RACE, EDUCATION, AND THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE IN THE 1990S:
THE MEANING OF BROWN v. BOARD
OF ED UCA TION RE-EXAMINED IN
LIGHT OF MILWAUKEE'S SCHOOLS OF
AFRICAN-AMERICAN IMMERSION
STEVEN SIEGEL
I. THE MILWAUKEE PLAN: AN OVERVIEW
On September 20, 1990, the Milwaukee Board of Education voted to
establish two public schools specifically designed to meet the academic and
social needs of black boys.1 The pilot schools, to be called Schools of Afri-
can-American Immersion, will emphasize black history and culture, build
self-esteem, and promote the rewards of responsible male behavior.2
Notwithstanding the focus of the curriculum, school administrators prom-
ise that the schools will admit girls and youngsters of all races.'
The Milwaukee Plan, the first of its kind in the nation, was proposed as
a means to counteract the pervasive academic underachievement of most
black boys in the city's school system.4 Only two percent of black boys
earned either an A or B grade point average and only seventeen percent
earned at least a C average.5 While comprising twenty-eight percent of all
students in the school district, black males represented fifty percent of all
students suspended and ninety-four percent of all students expelled in re-
cent years.6 Supporters of the plan contend that radical measures are neces-
sary to defeat the cycle of academic underachievement that contributes to
the disproportionate number of black men who become unemployed, jailed,
or murdered.7
Educators are sharply divided over the merits of the plan. Some critics
argue that an ethnocentric curriculum is inappropriate and educationally
1. Johnson, Milwaukee Creating Two Schools for Black Boys, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 30, 1990, at
1, col. 1.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1, col. 2.
4. Lawton, Two Schools Aimed for Black Males Set in Milwaukee, EDUC. WEEK, Oct. 10,
1990, at 1, col. 1.
5. Id. at 12, col. 1.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1, col. 1.
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unsound in a multicultural nation. Critics also point to the grave moral
and legal issues raised by a plan that they contend amounts to state-spon-
sored segregation.9 On the other hand, black proponents of the Milwaukee
Plan state that they are simply substituting an African-American perspec-
tive for a European-American perspective."0 Because many large urban
school districts are no longer educating large numbers of white children, the
proponents argue that they have a responsibility to give black children "a
good sense of self, a chance to relate to their identity and culture" through
an ethnocentric curriculum.I Some black educators also argue that black
and white students have different "learning styles" and thus some tradi-
tional methods of teaching and testing are inappropriate for black
students. 12
The educational issues raised by the Milwaukee Plan are inextricably
linked to constitutional issues of the highest order. This paper examines the
most important constitutional questions concerning whether an ethnic-ori-
ented schoolwide curriculum represents a new form of unconstitutional
state-initiated segregation. 3 Answering this question requires a return to
first principles of race, education, and the Equal Protection Clause1 4 an-
nounced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education.5 In
important ways the Milwaukee Plan provides a contemporary test of the
limits and the continuing vitality of the meaning, premises, and philosophi-
cal underpinnings of Brown.
8. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 1, at 26, col. 2 (statement of Charles V. Willie, Professor of
Education, Harvard University); see also Lawton, supra note 4, at 12, col. 1 (statement of Felmers
Chaney, President, Milwaukee Branch, National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People)
9. See, e-g., Hancock, Ujamaa Means Controversy, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 6, 1990, at 16, col.
4 (statement of Norman Siegel, Exectutive Director, New York Civil Liberties Union).
10. Johnson, supra note 1, at 26, col. 3 (statement of Joyce Mallory, black member of the
Milwaukee Board of Education).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 26, col. 1 (statement of Jawanza Kunjufu, black educational consultant); see also
Boateng, Combatting Deculturalization of the African-American Child in the Public School System,
in GOING TO SCHOOL: THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (K. Lomotey ed. 1990).
13. The Milwaukee Plan also presents the separate but related question of gender-based dis-
crimination within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. See Mississippi Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). This form of discrimination is outside the scope of this paper.
Also excluded from discussion is the applicability of statutory remedies for racial and gender
discrimination in the public schools pursuant to Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § § 2000a.
14. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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II. PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION
In Brown, the Supreme Court held that a state-initiated racial segrega-
tion of public schools renders such schools inherently unequal and violative
of the Equal Protection Clause.' 6 The Court thereby expressly overturned
the reasoning employed in a half-century of decisions in which it had per-
mitted state-sanctioned "separate but equal" facilities in education and cer-
tain other public and private functions." The Court based its conclusion
on essentially three principles: The psychological harm to black children
caused by state-initiated segregation; 8 the existence of certain "intangible"
factors which produce a superior learning environment in an integrated
rather than a segregated setting;19 and the critical role of the public schools
in contemporary society.20 Each of these principles is discussed in turn in
the following section.21
A. State-initiated segregation of public schools stigmatizes black children
and, in so doing, renders the segregated schools inherently
unequal
To separate [black children] from others of similar age and qualifica-
tions solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as
to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.22
Beneath this statement lies a series of assumptions. First, the segregated
public school system that existed in the South in 1954 was established by a
white-dominated society for the purpose of keeping blacks in an inferior
position. This assumption can be fairly characterized as a matter of judicial
notice.23 Second, black children's knowledge of the state's intent - even if
16. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
17. Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) is most often cited as the case that established
the doctrine of "separate but equal."
18. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
19. Id. at 493.
20. Id.
21. It is important to note at the outset that the 35 years of subsequent case law arising from
the Brown decision (including the Supreme Court decision known popularly as Brown II) were
principally concerned with the establishment of proper remedial measures and, to a lesser extent,
with the identification of nonstatutory state actions that have the effect of promoting public school
segregation. The Supreme Court has never chosen to revisit - and virtually no lower court has
been in a position to reconsider - the central principles underlying Brown. As previously stated,
the questions presented in the Milwaukee Plan may well require a reconsideration of Brown's
central principles.
22. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
23. This assumption, while implied throughout the opinion, is nowhere stated explicity.
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the segregated schools were nominally equal with respect to tangible factors
- impaired their ability to learn.24 This assumption was based at least in
part on contemporary social science research,25 the validity of which has
been the subject of continuing controversy and dispute.2 6 The third as-
sumption (also made explicit elsewhere in the opinion) is that blacks would
learn better in an integrated rather than segregated environment.2 7 It is
important to note that the third assumption does not necessarily derive
from the first or second.
With respect to the first two assumptions, the Brown Court never had
within its contemplation state-initiated segregation without demonstrably
invidious intent and thus it never had to confront the question of whether
stigma attaches to all state-initiated segregation (i.e., arguably the Milwau-
kee Plan) regardless of intent. This question, of course, appears to be more
sociological and psychological in nature than legal. But it is important to
remember that Brown was decided in large part on precisely these
grounds.28
The application of Brown's stigma standard (if that is what it is) to a
Milwaukee-like plan would present jurisprudential issues of exceptional
complexity. The underlying question may not be merely sociological and
psychological, as in Brown, but also pedagogical. Assuming a court finds
that a schoolwide ethnocentric curriculum constitutes state-initiated segre-
gation, the court might be forced to decide whether such a curriculum is
"invidious" within the meaning of Brown (L e., producing "a feeling of infer-
iority" or "retarding the educational and mental development" of black stu-
dents).29 Alternatively, a court might decide that the pedagogical question
need not be reached, finding instead that the Brown "invidious" standard
applies only to segregated public schools established by a governmental au-
thority - presumably controlled exclusively by whites - for the purpose of
keeping blacks in an inferior position.
24. Brown, 347 U.S. at 498.
25. Id. at 494 n. 11.
26. It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the validity of the social science findings that
provided at least a partial basis for the Brown decision. It is worth noting, however, that most
researchers who have subsequently examined these findings have concluded that the findings are
considerably more ambiguous than the original researchers had suggested. Several commentators
have declared that the findings are methodologically unsound and that the Court was in error to
rely on such findings. Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration and
Social Science Research in The Supreme Court, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 70 (1978); see
also Van Den Haag, Social Science Testimony in the Desegregation Cases - A Reply to Professor
Kenneth Clark, 6 VILL L. REv. 69 (1960).
27. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493; see also infra text accompanying notes 31-37.
28. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
29. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
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B. State-initiated segregated public schools are inherently unequal
because of "'intangible"factors
In finding state-initiated racially segregated public schools inherently
unequal, the Court in Brown also explicitly relied on prior cases involving
post-secondary schools in which the Court had found that black students
were deprived of equal educational opportunities because of "intangible"
factors.3 0 Examples of intangible factors in the context of a law school were
set out in Sweatt v. Painter decided four years before Brown:
What is more important, the University of Texas Law School pos-
sesses to a far greater degree [than the segregated black Texas law
school] those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement
but which make for greatness in a law school. Such qualities, to
name but a few, include reputation of the faculty, experience of the
administration, position and influence of the alumni, standing in the
community, traditions, and prestige. It is difficult to believe that one
who had a free choice between these law schools would consider the
question close.
Moreover, although the law is a highly learned profession, we
are well aware that it is an intensely practical one. The law school,
the proving ground for legal learning and practice, cannot be effec-
tive in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the
law interacts. Few students and no one who has practiced law
would choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed from the
interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is
concerned. The law school to which Texas is willing to admit peti-
tioner excludes from its student body members of the racial groups
which number 85% of the population of the State and include most
of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and other officials with
whom petitioner will inevitably be dealing when he becomes a mem-
ber of the Texas Bar. With such a substantial and significant seg-
ment of society excluded, we cannot conclude that the education
offered petitioner is substantially equal to that which he would re-
ceive if admitted to the University of Texas Law School.31
Put another way, blacks in a white-dominated society will learn better (or
will learn more of what they need to learn) in an integrated environment
rather than a segregated environment. Such "intangible considerations,"
the Court in Brown declared, "apply with added force to children in grade
and high schools."32
30. Id. at 493 (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950)).
31. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
32. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
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Brown's "intangible consideration" doctrine can be viewed as diametri-
cally opposed to the Milwaukee Plan in two ways. First, the doctrine ap-
pears to embrace the goal of integration, not merely the eradication of laws
requiring segregation. Second, the doctrine implicitly endorses a curricu-
lum and an educational setting that prepares the student for full participa-
tion in a society dominated by whites. It is difficult to argue that
Milwaukee's Schools of African-American Immersion will perform the as-
similative function envisioned by the Court in Brown.
C. State-initiated segregated public schools are constitutionally defective
in part because segregated black schools are disadvantaged with
respect to performing the critically important
functions of secularization, assimilation,
and Americanization
In approaching this problem [of whether or not the Equal Pro-
tection Clause is applicable, we must consider public education in
the light of its full development and its present place in American
life....
Today, education... is the very foundation of good citizenship.
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in help-
ing him to adjust normally to his environment.33
The evidence of whether the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment in-
tended to outlaw racial segregation in public schools is ambiguous, border-
ing on doubtful. 3' Because the Court in Brown could not frame its
argument in terms of the original intent of the framers, it chose to empha-
size what it considered the extreme importance of education in the mid-
twentieth century.35 The language the Court used (quoted above) assumes
great significance with respect to consideration of the Milwaukee Plan, be-
cause it reveals the Brown Court's view of the nature and proper function of
public school curricula.
Words such as "good citizenship," "cultural values," and "normal ad-
justment to the environment" are, of course, highly subjective and could
conceivably be appropriated by both supporters and opponents of the Mil-
waukee Plan to defend their respective positions. It seems clear, however,
that when considered in context with the rest of the Court's opinion (espe-
33. Id. at 492-93.
34. Bickel, The Original Understanding and Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1, 11-40
(1955); R. BERGER, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 123-25 (1977).
35. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.
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cially the principle contained within the discussion of "intangible factors"
36) these words were clearly intended to reinforce the view that public
schools have assumed responsibility for performing the critically important
functions of secularization,' assimilation, and Americanization. As previ-
ously stated, it would be difficult to argue that Milwaukee's Schools of Afri-
can-American Immersion will be well-suited to perform these functions.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE MILWAUKEE
PLAN BASED UPON ONE POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION OF THE
BROWN PRINCIPLES
The preceding section provided an overview of the major principles un-
derlying Brown and offered a preliminary assessment of the application of
these principles to the Milwaukee Plan. This section will consider an inter-
pretation of the Brown principles in a light most favorable to the Milwaukee
Plan.
A. The Milwaukee Plan is not state-initiated segregation: Students of all
races may apply to and attend Schools of African-American
Immersion
Brown was decided within a context of laws prohibiting students of one
race from attending public schools set aside for students of another race:
The so-called dual school system that existed in much of the South in
1954.37 Milwaukee's Schools of African-American Immersion will be open
to any student, regardless of race.38 In this limited sense, the Milwaukee
Plan does not constitute de jure segregation of the type most clearly impli-
cated in the Brown decision.
B. Even if the Milwaukee Plan is held to be a form of state-initiated
segregation, the Milwaukee Board of Education cannot be
imputed with the necessary intent to segregate within
the meaning of Brown or its progeny
While the Milwaukee Plan does not constitute de jure segregation of the
type most clearly implicated in the Brown decision, subsequent Supreme
Court school desegregation cases make it clear that the scope of Brown is
not limited to invalidating and remedying the effects of laws requiring dual
public school systems. In Keyes v. Denver,39 the Court upheld a lower court
36. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
37. See generally R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976).
38. Johnson, supra note 1, at 1, col. 2.
39. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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ruling finding school attendance zones "gerrymandered" to induce racial
segregation invalid for the same reason and to the same extent as statutorily
mandated segregation. 4° In Griffin v. County School Board,41 the Court
held that the closing of all public schools in a county was unconstitutional
because the Court found such closings were motivated by the state's inten-
tion to prevent white and black children from attending the same schools.42
In other words, the Court has subsequently interpreted the Brown holding
to mean that the state cannot do indirectly what it is prohibited from doing
directly, assuming, of course, that one can show the requisite intent.
With respect to the Milwaukee Plan, there can be no doubt that the
Milwaukee Board of Education harbored a very specific intent when it es-
tablished Schools of African-American Immersion,43 but whether the segre-
gation of black and white children can be fairly imputed to the Board
remains a principal issue for decision. For example, should the fact that
some, perhaps most, black children are attracted to and desire to learn
about "Eurocentric" culture (or, put another way, mainstream American
culture) while almost no white children display interest in African culture
be a subject of judicial notice? If so, should a court impute such knowledge
to the Milwaukee school board? Supporters of the Milwaukee Plan would
answer in the negative with respect to both questions. On a more practical
level, should it matter that the two schools which are slated to become
Schools of African-American Immersion are virtually all-black schools'
(presumably not as a result of pre-existing state-initiated segregation) and
therefore, the Plan will not directly yield any substantial net increase in
school segregation? Supporters of the Milwaukee Plan would answer in the
affirmative: It matters that the two schools are currently all-black precisely
because it goes to the intent of the Milwaukee school board to design curric-
ula to meet the needs of its existing school populations.45
40. Id. Some may argue that the Milwaukee Plan is a variant of the gerrymandered attend-
ance zone.
41. 377 U.s. 218 (1964).
42. Id. at 231.
43. In voting for the establishment of Schools of African-American Immersion, one black
member of the Milwaukee Board of Education declared, "African-American males are doing dis-
mally in our schools. We need to do something drastically different. And we need to do it
quickly." Johnson, supra note 1, at 1, col. 1 (quoting Joyce Mallery).
44. Id. at 1, col. 2.
45. Moreover, the Constitution does not require the state to racially integrate schools in
which the state did not directly or indirectly play a role in establishing the segregation.
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C. Even if the Milwaukee Plan is held to be a form of state-initiated
segregation accompanied by an intent to segregate, such "intent"
is benign and of a form not contemplated within the
holding of Brown or its progeny
As previously noted, if a court were to find that the schoolwide ethno-
centric curriculum embodied in the Milwaukee Plan were to constitute
state-initiated segregation accompanied by an intent to segregate, that court
might then be forced to decide whether the curriculum could be held to be
"invidious" within the meaning of Brown (ie., whether it produces "a feel-
ing of inferiority" or retards "the educational and mental development" of
black students)." In answering this question, the court will be forced to
decide whether to rely on the process of Brown or the result of Brown.
If the court elects to rely on the process of Brown, then the court would
look to current theories and research findings in education and related so-
cial sciences4 7 regarding the question of whether ethnocentric education is a
pedagogically sound approach to educating ethnic minorities. Supporters
of the Milwaukee Plan would argue that the question presented is suffi-
ciently different than the one before the Court in 1954 and so that, the
Brown result (as distinct from the Brown process) is not controlling. Using
the Brown process, on the other hand, the court (unlike the Supreme Court
of 1954) would find little in the way of clear and definitive guidance on this
point: Specialists appear to be sharply divided on the question of whether
ethnocentric education is pedagogically sound.4 8 Supporters of the Milwau-
kee Plan could argue, however, that there is enough social science research
to provide at least a rational basis4 9 for a school board to determine that
schoolwide ethnocentric curriculum is appropriate for some minority
students.
If the court instead elects to rely on the result of Brown to decide
whether a schoolwide ethnocentric curriculum is invidious, then the court's
decision would seem to favor the opponents of the Milwaukee Plan. This
conclusion is derived from Brown's clear pronouncements that favor racial
46. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
47. The Brown Court in part relied on contemporary findings of social science research. Id.
at 494, n.l1; see also supra note 26.
48. See, e.g., Boateng, Combatting Deculturalization of the African-American Child in the
Public School System, in GOING TO SCHOOL: THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (K.
Lomotey ed. 1990) (supporting ethnocentric education). But see Hacker, Trans-National
America, N.Y. Review of Books, Nov. 22, 1990, at 19.
49. If the Brown decision is controlling, then the Milwaukee Plan would be subject to a strict
scrutiny rather than a rational basis standard of review. But supporters of the Milwaukee Plan
would argue that Brown - or at least key portions thereof - is not applicable.
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integration in public schools for its own sake.50 In the face of these pro-
nouncements, supporters of the Milwaukee Plan can point to one central
proposition which at least partially distinguishes the Plan on its face from
the situation confronting the Supreme Court in 1954: That Brown stands
for the unconstitutionality of segregated public schools established by a
governmental authority (probably controlled exclusively by whites)51 for
the purpose of keeping blacks in an inferior position. If, above all else,
Brown stands for this proposition, then the Milwaukee Plan is
constitutional.5 2
D. Courts are not competent to evaluate the curricular
decisions of school officials
Supporters of the Milwaukee Plan argue that establishing a school de-
voted to African-American culture is no different than establishing a school
devoted to French, Japanese, or other national culture or language.53
Courts have rarely intervened in curricular decisions of school officials
(with the major exception of establishment clause cases).54 A decision in-
validating the Milwaukee Plan on constitutional grounds would elevate the
courts into a super-educational board with final authority on curricular de-
cisions in matters of language, culture, and civics. With few exceptions,
such decisions properly rest with local boards of education and local educa-
tors, with appropriate supervision by the political branches of government.
IV. CONCLUSION: WOULD THE SUPPORTERS OF THE MILWAUKEE
PLAN ARGUE THAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION WAS
WRONGLY DECIDED?
Brown v. Board of Education stands as probably the most important
Supreme Court decision of this century and the seminal event in the devel-
opment of the mid-twentieth century civil rights movement.5 5 For, all its
social and political importance to blacks, however, the decision contains
50. See supra text accompanying notes 30-36 for discussion of the Brown Court's reliance on
"intangible" factors and the critical role of public schools in contemporary society with respect to
secularization, assimilation, and Americanization.
51. The Milwaukee Board of Education consists of eight members, two of whom are black.
Both black members voted in favor of the Plan. Johnson, supra note 1, at 26, col. 3.
52. While some critics of the plan may argue that its probable effect is to keep blacks in an
inferior position, it cannot seriously be argued that this was the purpose of the Milwaukee Board
of Education in establishing Schools of African-American Immersion. See id.
53. Lawton, supra note 4, at 1, col. 1.
54. For example, the Supreme Court has held invalid a statute prohibiting the teaching of the
theory of evolution in the public schools. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
55. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976).
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certain major premises and philosophical underpinnings that have at times
appeared inconsistent with positions taken by leading black educators and
political activists.5 6 This inconsistency has been brought sharply into focus
with the advent of Milwaukee's plan to establish Schools of African-Ameri-
can Immersion.
Perhaps because of its critical historical, political, and symbolic impor-
tance, Brown has been largely exempt from searching critical commentary
from those commentators who have claimed an affiliation with what used to
be called the "civil rights movement," or the loosely-knit coalition that sur-
vives in place of the movement. In light of the Milwaukee Plan, this silence
may be at an end. And regardless of where one stands on this extremely
difficult subject, reexamination of the limits and the continuing vitality of
aspects of the nearly forty year old decision is healthy and overdue.5 7 As
the United States becomes an ever-more multiethnic and multicultural soci-
ety, the meaning and limits of Brown become a vital concern not just for the
courts, but for the political branches and for us all.
56. See supra notes 12 and 48.
57. Of Principles A, B and C outlined in Part I of this paper, almost all commentators would
accept the continuing vitality of Principle A. The Milwaukee Plan would probably be upheld
under both a broad or strict view of Principle A. How one feels about Principles B and C -
whether they are an integral part of the Brown holding and, if so, whether they continue to possess
vitality with respect to the educational and social concerns of the 1990s - will largely determine
whether one supports or opposes the Milwaukee Plan.

